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ABSTRACT

Ian McLaughlin
History Department
Bachelor of Arts

This paper revisits a long-neglected controversy over the use of legislative
instructions during the Irish Free Trade crisis and explores its impact on the debate over
Parliamentary reform in the first years of Grattan’s Parliament. I argue that the episode
exposed significant tension between the Parliamentary and popular wings of the Patriot
movement—one that most accounts of this era fail to note—while also leading to a major
rethinking of traditional notions of representation. Importantly, Irish constituents went
beyond defending their simple right to author instructions (as their American and English
counterparts had done before), instead advancing them as a novel instrument through
which to measure and express the national will—and thus to direct policy in a more
“democratic” direction. As such, this controversy not only contributes to our
understanding of the emergence of public opinion as a political force, but also suggests
that the Patriots’ rhetorical embrace of popular sovereignty was taken rather more
seriously than intended, as well as provides an important additional context for the
divisive Dungannon Conventions that would follow. The paper builds on the work of
Padraig Higgins in restoring political agency to non-elite actors during the Revolutionary
War era, while furthering it by putting the issues advanced by those actors in dialogue
with “high political” developments.
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Introduction
Among the many unintended consequences of the American Revolution, the
radical transformation of the Irish political system surely ranks as one of the most
profound. In the space of a few short years, Britain granted unprecedented economic and
constitutional concessions to its quasi-colonial dependency, as goals long sought by the
reformist Patriot movement were realized in quick succession. Not everyone, however,
was happy with the apparent price of achieving such rapid change: the large-scale
involvement of the lower and middle orders in politics. From non-importation agreements
to legislative instructions, a newly active citizenry, led by volunteer militia companies,
employed novel methods of political expression to pressure a recalcitrant British
government. Even once their immediate ends had been achieved, however, they refused
to abandon their new place in the public sphere. This worried many of the same elites
who had once welcomed their efforts. Patriot MPs in particular were divided by the
extent of popular involvement. While some, such as party leader Henry Grattan and Cork
MP John Hely-Hutchinson, thought the demonstrations of popular support lent necessary
momentum to their stalled policy agenda, others, like Hely-Hutchinson’s fellow Corkite
MP Richard Longfield, feared the people had arrogated too much power to themselves to
determine the movement’s strategy and direction.
These clashing viewpoints came to a head in the so-called “free trade” crisis of
1779, an economic contraction caused by the war-disrupted Irish export industry. After
Lord North’s government refused to lift any trade restrictions, many in the Patriot
movement coalesced around the idea of having the Dublin Parliament pass a “short
money” funding bill in an attempt to force its Westminster counterpart’s hand. The bill,
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an eighteenth-century version of a government shutdown, would allocate only six
months’ worth of funding (rather than the traditional two years’) to the Lord Lieutenant’s
administration based in Dublin Castle. Such a move during wartime would worry the
British, as it would leave the country even less able to defend itself from a French
invasion. Beginning in October, freeholders from twenty different Irish constituencies
convened to draft instructions to their MPs in Dublin in support of the bill. The drastic
means proposed, delivered through the traditionally contentious medium of instructions,
provoked a mixed reaction from Patriot MPs, all of whom supported a free trade in
theory. Their responses, printed alongside the instructions themselves in the Dublin
Evening Post, provide an important site for investigating the articulation of elite anxiety
in Irish politics due to the unique position of legislative instructions in eighteenth-century
politics.
By this time, legislative instructions had a long history in the Atlantic Isles,
although they became especially important in the second half of the eighteenth century.
Instructions, like petitions, were written and signed by groups of freeholding voters to
address a specific purpose. Unlike petitions, they originated from a single constituency,
were addressed to that constituency’s parliamentary representative(s), and usually
addressed issues of local, rather than national, significance (or at most, national issues as
they had an impact on local interests). There were also important differences in how these
two instruments of citizen participation were received. Petitions, if they gathered enough
signatures, were considered by the full Parliament, whereas instructions were meant only
for the addressed MPs. Finally, instructions were widely seen to come with a claim of
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binding authority, obligating a representative to vote a particular way.1 Because of this,
representatives generally felt compelled to respond—and to justify themselves in the
event they decided to disobey.
It is also useful to see instructions within the broader panorama of popular politics
in the eighteenth century. Parades, processions, and even novel consumption practices
(such as non-importation agreements used in Ireland and America or the sugar boycotts
of the anti-slavery movement) served to manifest the general desires of the political
nation in an era of changing ideas about the importance, and measurability, of public
opinion. None, however, allowed for the same level of specific policy intervention as
instructions. Equally, none left as extensive a trail of systematized reflections on the
nature of representation and the role of the citizen.
Of the two books on American Revolution-era Ireland that mention the Irish
instructions episode at all, both do so in a cursory manner. Instead, each assigns greater
weight to other forms of extra-parliamentary political activity within the Patriot
movement. Maurice O’Connell, in a now-classic account, highlights the role of parades
and processions, stressing the importance of the (armed) Volunteer companies in
provoking elite action. He correctly notes that the instructions were an “embarrassment”
to (some) MPs without recognizing their variety or significance.2 This cursory treatment
clashes with the obvious importance of instructions to contemporaries, which this paper
will help demonstrate.3 Padraig Higgins, in his account of popular politicization during
1

Christopher Terranova, “The Constitutional Life of Legislative Instructions in America,” NYU Law
Review 84, no. 5, 1333-5.
2
See Maurice O’Connell, Irish Politics and Social Conflict in the Age of the American Revolution
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976), 175-180.
3
See, for example, Anon., A Candid Display, of the Reciprocal Conduct of Great Britain and her Colonies:
From the Origins of the Present Contest, to the Claim of Independency, in Harry T. Dickinson, ed., Ireland
in the Age of Revolution, 1760-1805, (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2013), vol. 2.
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this period, considers a far broader range of political and semi-political activities than
O’Connell, including instructions, but does so in a way that emphasizes the agency of
non-elites, rather than the dynamic and complex interaction and interdependence between
popular and Parliamentary forms of Patriotism.4 This paper attempts to remedy this
deficit in the literature through a comprehensive examination of the Patriot responses to
the instructions of the free trade crisis, arguing that they reflect nothing less than the
opening skirmish in an ongoing war among the elite as to whether and how far to accept
the new, democratic politics they themselves had unleashed. The paper then reevaluate
key conflicts over parliamentary reform in the 1780s, showing how the categories
pioneered in 1779 persisted and were creatively repurposed to fit a surprisingly broad
spectrum of positions.
The Political and Economic Context of Revolution-Era Ireland
The eighteenth-century Irish Parliament labored under two basic restrictions
imposed by England. The first, dating from Poyning’s Law of 1494, stipulated that all
bills needed the authorization of the English Privy Council in order to become law. In
practice, this meant that bills would be drawn up and debated in Dublin, and then passed
on to Westminster for approval. If approved, they became law; if not, Westminster sent a
revised version back to Dublin for passage.5 The second restriction was the Declaratory
Act of 1720, which asserted British legislative sovereignty over the Irish parliament.
Ireland also suffered economically from its relationship with imperial Britain. Its
economy was already small and stagnant, but the British system of trade restrictions,

4

See Padraig Higgins, A Nation of Politicians: Gender, Patriotism, and Political Culture in Late
Eighteenth Century Ireland (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), 118-122.
5
O’Connell, 18-19.
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known collectively as the Navigation Acts, exacerbated the situation. Inspired by the
economic philosophy of mercantilism, the Acts severely limited the trade of every
constituent part of the empire in favor of England itself.6 Ireland could not trade at all
with Britain’s Asian possessions—and with the American colonies only if the goods were
routed through English ports first. Various quotas and restrictions were placed on most
goods shipped from Ireland to Continental Europe, including wool, the most important
Irish export.7 In peacetime, Irish merchants had often been able to get around the
restrictions through smuggling.8 But when the Revolutionary War broke out, the British
navy began to enforce the laws more stringently, and Ireland began to feel the full brunt
of its disadvantaged position within the empire.
In the decades prior to the American Revolution, opposition surfaced periodically
in parliament to both the constitutional and economic restrictions placed on Ireland under
the loose heading of the “Patriot party.” However, the Patriots were not a party in the
sense of the Whigs and Tories of contemporary Westminster politics. Their agenda was
clear, but revolved around only a few issues; even more importantly, the large majority of
MPs never made their allegiance quite clear. They often liked to style themselves as the
incorruptible opposition, able to vote in the national interest because immune to court
patronage. However, this was not really much truth to this self-portrayal: “It was a
common thing for paid servants of the Crown, while in general supporting the
Government, to go on particular [generally constitutional] questions into violent
opposition, and for men, who had on particular questions been the most active opponents

6

Larry Sawers, “The Navigation Acts revisited,” Economic History Review, 262-284.
Speeches of the Right Hon. Henry Grattan (New York: Eastburn, Kirk, and Co., 1813), xlix.
8
O’Connell, 37-39.
7
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of Government, to pass suddenly into its ranks.”9 For the purposes of this study, all MPs
who responded to their constituents’ instructions will be considered “Patriots,” as it is
extremely unlikely that they would have denied the label, given its overwhelming
popularity during the war and the banally nationalist connotations it had taken on.10
By the time France entered the war against Britain in 1778, Ireland’s poverty was
so extreme that its government could not afford to outfit an army. To be ready in case of
French invasion, Parliament and the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland reluctantly authorized
groups of citizens around the country to form militia units known as Volunteer
companies. Although the Volunteers saw action fought only once (the threat of invasion
never materialized), they remained in the public eye through frequent military parades.11
The companies were composed almost entirely of propertied Protestants, as Catholics of
any means were forbidden to bear arms. Nevertheless, the Volunteer companies were
immensely popular with Catholic and Protestant landowners alike.12 They increased so
rapidly in size—totaling about 40,000 members by 1780—that they became a cause of
alarm to the British Lord-Lieutenant, as he could not be sure of their loyalty.13
The middling sorts, especially merchants and shop owners, who formed the core
of the Volunteers generally supported the agenda of the Patriot party, including their
demand for a “free trade”—meaning in practice a repeal of the Navigation Acts insofar as
they applied to Ireland.14 The Patriots only began to have success in the charged
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Lecky, 144.
When an MP is known to have been an active and enthusiastic leader of the movement, this will be
noted.
11
In 1779, the Larne Company forced a French privateer wandering off the coast to strike its colors. See R.
B. McDowell, Ireland in the Age of Imperialism and Revolution (New York: Oxford UP, 1979), 258-60.
12
As evidenced by public subscriptions by Catholics and Protestants to pay the Volunteers’ expenses. See
Alfred E. Zimmern, Henry Grattan, the Stanhope Essay (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1902), 22.
13
McDowell, 261-262; Zimmern 23.
14
O’Connell, 20, 22-23.
10
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environment of the American War for Independence. As Ireland’s economic depredation
grew visibly worse, they, in collaboration with the Volunteers, adopted some of the
radical methods of the American colonists. Early in 1779, for example, committees
around the country instigated non-importation agreements, refusing to buy goods of
British make until their own producers were free to export without restriction. Toward the
end of the same year, the Dublin regiment of Volunteers paraded on William III’s
birthday (November 4), a traditionally Protestant holiday, carrying signs like “A Free
Trade—Or Else” and “Relief to Ireland.”15
Because the Volunteer companies provided a visible manifestation of popular
support for Patriot positions, most opposition MPs actively courted their favor, at least
initially. (Indeed, many MPs served as the honorary captains of their local Volunteer
companies.16) By the time some began to sour on the Volunteers’ “politics of association”
as a result of the instructions episode, it was in many ways too late: the militia companies
had come to symbolize the Patriot movement itself. As Padraig Higgins has shown, many
Irish newspapers participated in this mythologizing process, actively positioning
themselves as champions and spokesmen of the “brave, determined Volunteers.”17 Local
businesses advertised such wares as stirrups and uniforms for the companies on the front
pages of the papers. “Gentleman” Catholics underwrote many of their expenses through
subscriptions.18 Alehouses and company meetings provided a forum for Volunteers (and
others) to discuss politics, helping to further politicize the movement. Opposing the
visceral Patriotism they embodied with abstract considerations of political economy, as
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O’Connell, 174-175; McDowell, 267.
See “To Luke Gardiner, Captain of Castleknock Volunteers,” Dublin Evening Post, November 16, 1779.
17
Higgins, A Nation of Politicians, 42-44.
18
Dublin Evening Post, November 25, 1779; on Catholics, see again Zimmern, 22.
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many MPs felt obligated to do in their responses to the short money bill instructions,
would prove difficult.
The Instructions
As Ireland’s situation grew worse and the Patriot movement grew stronger,
Britain remained complacent. Early in 1779, Parliament rejected a limited proposal for
the relief of Irish trade. Sometime later, the Dublin Parliament, spurred on by its Patriot
MPs, unanimously approved a resolution informing King George III that “no temporizing
expedient, but a FREE and UNLIMITED TRADE to all its ports, could save this nation
from destruction.”19 This declaration, however promising, was not deemed sufficient by
the Patriot movement at large; it had seized upon a more radical tactic. To force the hand
of the obstinate “Pimlico Parliament,” pamphleteers and more radical MPs began to
advocate the passage of a short money bill.
In the run-up to the King William’s Day parade, a call appeared in the Dublin
Evening Post for the freeholders of the Irish counties to prepare “to instruct their
representatives, relative to their parliamentary conduct.”20 Although their authors took the
occasion to address a number of contemporary issues, such as relief for Catholics and/or
dissenting Protestants, the instructions were written primarily to secure votes for the
short-money bill. For the most part, their tone was mild, almost plaintive; despite the
oppositional rhetoric used in some pamphlets and newspapers, the instructions’ authors
did not see themselves as acting against their representatives, but rather in collaboration
with them. More reasons for this will be considered below, but it seems likely that the
instructions’ process of origination screened against self-consciously radical opinions: the
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Dublin Evening Post, November 25. 1779.
Dublin Evening Post, October 21, 1779.
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freeholders’ meetings were generally convened by the local High Sheriff, rendering them
a fundamentally respectable affair.
The general symbiosis between a local elite and their more middling constituents
can be seen in the case of one important exception: the Dublin University (Trinity
College Dublin) constituency. As the month to draft instructions wore on, some of the
University’s scholars accused the provost (who in this case held the convening power of a
High Sheriff), John Hely-Hutchinson, of deliberately refusing to call the meeting,
allegedly in order to “deprive [the University’s MPs] of the merit of complying with
instructions.” The reasoning of the accusers was that Hely-Hutchinson thought to secure
one of the University of Dublin seats for a personal friend by making the MPs appear out
of step with the national cause. An anonymous “Scholar of the House” insisted in a reply
there was some misunderstanding, and that the provost would surely call a meeting if
properly requested—if not, however, “any elector” had the power to do so in his stead.21
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that any constituency circumvented the normal
process. In fact, most proudly named the high sheriff that had presided at the meeting in
the preface to their instructions—a detail MPs, in turn, frequently noted in their
responses.
If they saw themselves as operating with an established political order, however,
the freeholders were under no illusions that this order was perfect. Throughout the
instructions, a general distrust of court patronage emanates. Eighteenth-century radical
Whig tropes—accusations of budget waste, cries of “placemen and pensioners” corroding
national virtue—are used to stand in for anxiety that MPs might be bribed by the

21

Dublin Evening Post, November 16, 1779.
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government at Dublin Castle to vote against the short-money bill. An open letter to
Parliament from “Hibernicus” that accompanied the Post’s call for instructions on
October 23 urged MPs to stand strong against the “syren [sic] call” of court patronage.
While basking in the assured “paternal care of a patriot Legislature,” “Hibernicus”
warned that sinecures would be offered to dissuade Hibernia’s noble representatives
assembled in “the Irish senate.”22 Thus the confidence expressed by the letter’s
flourishing Classical rhetoric is rather undermined by its specific admonitions and the
fact of its existence. In attempt to get around seeming disingenuous, instructions often
employed a dual strategy, expressing confidence in their particular MPs to act
independent of crown influence while voicing concerns about the overall integrity of the
legislative body. The constituents of Tyrone expressed their loathing of patronage in
quite universal terms, urging their MPs to abolish “all unnecessary pensions and
employments,” striking at the root of the system that gave the Crown untoward influence
over the decisions of the people’s body.23
Astonishingly, their request to end one of the bases of eighteenth-century
government was not even the most forward part of the Tyrone instructions: they
enumerated, in some detail, other woes facing the kingdom, from an increasing national
debt to a recent rise in the number of pensions, grounding their principal request (to vote
for a short-money bill) as the inevitable conclusion of incontrovertible—and universally
held—facts. Like other counties, the freeholders in Tyrone saw themselves as full
participants in a national drama and framed their instructions accordingly. Co. Dublin

22

October 23, 1779. The use of “senate” is only one example of Patriot writers’ invocation of classical
rhetoric. The Irish Parliament was, like that of the British, divided into houses of Commons and Lords.
23
Dublin Evening Post, 25 November 1779.
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suggested an audit of public finances, while Wexford more baldly attributed elements of
the crisis to the “rapacity of ministers” and the “pensioners imposed upon us.”24 They
were so bold, not because they thought their representatives did not know better, but
precisely because they believed that all within the Patriot movement shared general
beliefs and had access to the same knowledge. As the constituents of Cork wrote, the
problems of Irish trade were “too well-known to need being described.”25 Caught
between the influence of Hibernicus and more radical writers, like an “old hearty lover of
the people” from Galway who asserted that only the appearance of the Volunteers had
rejuvenated “the flagging nerves of our once pusillanimous, if not venal P----s [Patriots],”
it seems the country’s freeholders saw themselves, to varying degrees, as co-equal to
their MPs—and thus, equally competent to weigh in on national affairs.26 This was a
marked subversion of the normal pattern of instructions, in which constituents spoke of
how their particular interests might be affected by proposed legislation, a matter of
which they were more likely to have knowledge, rather than attempting to speak of the
national interest.27
For all their boldness in rhetorical style and subject matter, few of the instructions
expressed the binding language typical to traditional instructions, and many explicitly
renounced the title “instructions.” Maurice O’Connell has written of these instructions
that, though some avoided words like “instruct,” or “insist,” all “impl[ied] a degree of
compulsion in addressing their representatives.”28 This is clearly contradicted by, to take
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Dublin Evening Post, 4, 16 November 1779.
Dublin Evening Post, 25 November 1779.
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Dublin Evening Post, 25 November 1779.
27
For examples of specific, locally oriented instructions, see Richard Bourke, Empire and Revolution: The
Political Life of Edmund Burke (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2015), 376-385.
28
O’Connell, 178.
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one example, the city of Dublin, which, professing trust in the “honourable, upright, and
disinterested” character of their MPs, wrote that they “should not think of conveying any
instructions to [them].” Rather, the dire circumstances compelled them only to make their
“sentiments” known.29 The sheriff of Co. Wexford used similar language in the address
he authored on behalf of freeholders there: somewhat amusingly, he insisted to
Wexford’s MPs that his sole intent had been “to make known to you the unanimous voice
of your constituents”; what they did with that knowledge of popular opinion was
apparently up to them.30
The confusing reticence displayed by some constituents seems to have its roots in
a perception that their role was essentially plebiscitary, confirming the decisions of
Parliamentary leadership. In this way, the instructions served to provide cover for
representatives worried about justifying their potentially irresponsible vote on the money
bill, allowing them to point to overwhelming public pressure. Co. Tyrone winked at this
understanding, clarifying that their MPs should consider their address “not as a direction
to your conduct, so much as a means to add weight to your exertions in the public
cause.”31 In this way, the authors of the instructions, by and large, were not so much
concerned with compelling obedience, but with fulfilling a ceremonial role in a new and
exciting pageant of national politics. When they discovered that some MPs were less than
enthusiastic about the money bill (or worse: less than enthusiastic about being instructed
on something they nevertheless fully intended on voting for), there was a widespread

29

Dublin Evening Post, 4 Nov. 1779.
Dublin Evening Post, 16 Nov. 1779.
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sense that the “social compact” guiding the movement had been broken—a reaction this
paper will discuss only briefly, below.32
Many of the instructions were quite explicit about the new conception of
citizenship guiding their actions. The freeholders of Co. Tyrone, for example, declared
that “we should hold ourselves unworthy of being members of a free state, did we remain
silent spectators.” Voters from the County of Dublin (assembled separately from the
City) stated “we should hold ourselves wanting in duty … if we did not communicate to
you the voice of the people.”33 Armagh was slightly more oblique, declaring only that it
was “a Matter of the highest Importance” for the counties to make known “the
Sentiments of every body of Electors, at this critical Junction,” without connecting this
newfound duty to manifest public opinion with any explicit notion of citizenship.34 What
is clear is that, regardless of how it was understood, many throughout the popular Patriot
movement felt an obligation and an expectation to intervene in the Parliamentary process
in favor of a very particular solution to the free trade crisis.
What is also clear is that many were uncertain of how to reconcile this
unprecedentedly large-scale, coordinated effort with the older tradition of legislative
instructions. We have already seen one possible response: to write with extreme
deference, defining a new role for their enterprise as merely register of public sentiment.
Another group staked out a position somewhere between advice and instruction. This was
typified by Co. Armagh, which used more or less forceful phrases for the various items
on its long list of policy preferences. Using the rather soft word “recommend” for the
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short-money bill, the citizens of Armagh nevertheless “recommend[ed]” that their MPs
worked for its passage “with all [their] power,” implying that, though they did not want
to come across as impudent, they fully expected to be obeyed. In other places, they
recommended without qualification. When it came to the shakier idea of assembling a
committee to examine the national debt, Armagh chose to “propose [their idea] for …
consideration” only.35 Other counties used even more ambivalent phrases, like “hope and
expect,” or “desire and expect.”36 In doing so, they were careful not to signal distrust of
their representatives and, like their even more mildly phrased counterparts, did not seem
to think instructions were necessary to secure the short-money bill.
Finally, there were some counties, such as Cork and Louth, that used the type of
assertive language corresponding with O’Connell’s characterization of the instructions.
Cork’s freeholders made clear that they were writing “to recommend to, and instruct”
their MPs, Patriots Richard Longfield and John Hely-Hutchinson. They also highlighted
the electoral consequences of disobedience on such an important matter, reminding
Longfield and Hely-Hutchinson to act, not only “for the approbation of [their] country,”
but for the “future support … of [their] constituents as well.”37 Louth voters were only
slightly less direct, making clear that they viewed a six-month money bill was the only
“sure and efficacious” method to securing a free trade, yet conceding that the choice to
pull the proverbial lever “remain[ed] with the Representatives of the people.”38
The wide range of approaches exhibited by the instructions shows just how novel
and unprecedented this moment really was. Most constituents acted as though the call for
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instructions were a carefully coordinated stunt orchestrated by Patriot leadership to
mobilize pressure—no different, in principle, from the parades that marched through
Dublin on King William’s Day. As such, they drafted statements that were closer to a
declaration of sentiments than a legislative instruction as traditionally understood. Other
groups shied away from the language of instruction as well, while making it clear that
they understood how the vote was supposed to go. This style of wording—to “hope &
expect”—reflects a similar lack of agency, an implied unity of purpose between
Parliament and the people, with Parliament leading forth and the people merely lending
their voice, perhaps in part to drown out any temptation to defect for an offer of royal
patronage. Only a few groups were bold enough to fulfill the logical implications of the
exercise and explicitly extend the domain of legislative instructions to include items of
national, not solely local, concern. Regardless of the wording of their own instructions,
many MPs were so affronted by the coordinated campaign that they spoke of all of them
as if in the last category.
The Parliamentary Response
On November 9, as the instructions began to pour in to Dublin, a fierce debate
about them broke out in the Irish Commons during debate on a seemingly unrelated
subject. A member had proposed the repeal of the hearth tax, speaking eloquently of its
inefficiency and disproportionate impact on the poor. The proposal seemed destined to
pass, but then three MPs spoke against it. The first two speakers’ criticisms were
pedantic, primarily disputing the facts undergirding the proposal. Then Henry Grattan
rose to speak. Disclaiming any objective to cast doubt on the “humane intentions” behind
the measure, the Patriot leader alleged that it might, if passed, get in the way of the
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country’s most pressing priority, a free trade. If Parliament eliminated a tax in the midst
of a budgetary crisis, it would inevitably have to introduce a new tax to compensate, and
quite potentially overcompensate, for the lost revenue. Not only would any attempt to
stabilize the budget in this way undermine the urgency of the case for free trade, but it
would, more importantly for Grattan, risk crossing the constituent “Associations” which
had formed across the country.
William Brownlow, MP for Armagh, rose to second Grattan’s opposition to
repeal of the tax, agreeing that it would only “exasperate” the people, yet he eviscerated
him for his avowed support of instructions. That associations had formed to pressure
members of Parliament “to vote contrary to their judgments” was something Brownlow
found both “extraordinary” and unacceptable. In response, Grattan launched into a fullthroated defense of the instructions. Claiming he “considered a member of Parliament but
as the servant of his constituents,” he defended freeholders’ right to hold their
representatives accountable through instructions. Brownlow clarified that he believed in
the right of the people to advise their representatives but maintained that they could never
compel them.
Other MPs took up Brownlow’s arguments. The Attorney General called, perhaps
hyperbolically, for the disfranchisement of the authors of the instructions, which he called
“a new and unconstitutional mode of dictating to Parliament.” An astonished Grattan
reminded the assembly of the importance of associational politics in the country’s recent
success at securing serious attention from Westminster; further, the Volunteers had
single-handedly prodded awake the Dublin Parliament from its pre-Revolutionary state of
“stupefaction.” Brownlow, backpedaling from the Attorney General’s extreme rhetoric,
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provided the clearest statement of principled Patriot opposition to the instructions:
associations were wonderful, he owned, but voters had overstepped their bounds in trying
to influence the direction or parliamentary debate, or to tie MPs down in ways that
interfered with their responsibility to make independent judgments.
Sir Henry Cavendish, MP for Lismore, provided a complex account of the rise of
the Patriot movement that provides a clue to how many in the Irish elite saw the free
trade instructions in particular as a violation of the former boundaries of popular politics.
“Associations,” Cavendish said—referring in this case strictly to the Volunteer
companies—had “perhaps” prevented a French invasion, it was true, and could
conceivably be “productive of further good” going forward. Precluding accusations that
the Volunteers and their supporters were a dangerous rabble, Cavendish even
acknowledged that their members were “some of the greatest and the best men in the
nation.” It was also true, however, that their political opinions had been “tampered with”
by a rabid, even “seditious” press, rendering the content of their instructions suspect.
Worse, the press had led some of them to believe they had the right to bind their MPs
through instructions. He urged his fellows against “follow[ing] the advice of their
constituents against their own reason” and reiterated the doctrine that “constituents may
advise, but cannot compel” their representatives.39 Flipping on its head the trope of
attributing a king’s wrongheaded decisions to his advisors, Cavendish defended the
integrity of “the people” while simultaneously impugning their “advisors,” the press; as
with the original trope, the circumlocution served to sideline the acknowledged source of
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the nation’s sovereignty without criticizing it directly.40 More narrowly, Cavendish
reflected a sense that the Patriot elite had lost control of the popular movement and would
now have to keep them in check.
MPs used more care in their formal responses to the instructions than they did on
the floor of Parliament (although the report of this debate was published in the press at
the time). Those who did feel reluctant to embrace free trade instructions, either in
principle of in substance, were as eager not to upset the new popular machine as Grattan
was to exploit it. Their responses can be roughly divided into two categories. On the first
level, MPs danced around the question of how they intended to vote on the short-money
bill; in this way they hoped to avoid the larger question of whether they were obligated to
do so. A more common approach was to differentiate between the ends (in most cases, a
free trade, though encompassing other proposals) and the means (a short-money bill, an
audit of state finances, etc.) proposed in the instructions. MPs in this camp emphasized
their support for the former, while forthrightly confessing their reservations about the
latter. Importantly, none outright rejected their constituents’ right to send the instructions.
Undoubtedly, they feared the political consequences (of which Grattan had so forcefully
warned), yet on a deeper level they seem unsure of how to proceed in the new political
context the instructions had created.
Ironically, William Brownlow, one of the foremost Patriot skeptics of instructions
during the debate in Parliament, wrote one of the most non-committal responses.
Carefully sifting the views he had expressed to his colleagues so forcefully only days
prior to writing, he claimed that he was honored to receive the people’s advice “upon
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every Subject that you shall think deserving of your Attention” (by itself a cool reception
for freeholders who had just breathlessly announced their conviction that the national
crisis called for their voice). He would be doubly honored, he went on, if circumstances
should permit him to act in accordance with their “Wishes.” Driving the knife in further,
Brownlow explained that he was, in fact, leaning toward supporting the short-money bill,
as his constituents desired. But the fact he portrayed himself as at leisure to consider the
proposed legislation for himself implicitly denied that thee instructions had binding
power. In the end, Brownlow embraced a more traditional conception of representative
politics, insisting he could only promise to promote what he determined to be the “public
good,” regardless of how this aligned with public opinion.41
Those MPs who differentiated between ends and means, by contrast, emphasized
that they were obeying the instructions in intent, although they still did not acknowledge
any obligation to do so. John Foster, MP for Louth, explained that a six-month money bill
would damage public credit, but agreed on the critical importance of securing a free
trade. To soften the blow of rejection, he clarified that the “hoped … to act agreeable to
the desire” laid out in the instructions—as if that held the same value as honoring the
substance of the request. Richard Longfield of Cork rather extravagantly professed to
value nothing more than constituent approval. He boasted of the “well-connected and
close union” he enjoyed with his voters, explaining it could only be the result of deep
similarity of viewpoints and of “reciprocal … interests.” He thanked the Cork freeholders
for their advice, but refused to commit on the short-money bill, claiming he did not yet
have enough information to determine whether it would be “effectual” in securing a free
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trade (implying that his constituents did not either).42 Both Foster and Longfield hoped
that by emphasizing their willingness to hear advice and their deep commitment to the
Patriot goal of free trade, they would be absolved, respectively, of either committing to or
carrying out the people’s particular will.
Even some of the MPs who planned to support the short-money bill took care to
step around the loaded theoretical issues raised by the instructions. They generally did
this by emphasizing the independent process through which they had arrived at their
conclusions. Armar Lowry Corry and James Stewart, authoring a rare joint response to
the freeholders of Armagh, wrote that they were “happy to find that the sentiments of our
constituents so perfectly agree with our own.” Their statement precisely echoed the
language of the instructions they had received, agreeing with each proposal, from
pursuing legal relief for Protestant dissenters to opposing it for Catholics. When they did
make an abstract statement about instructions, it closely paralleled the wording of the
address they had received: “our endeavors in the public cause will receive considerable
additional weight when seconded by the unanimous voice of our constituents.”43 Not only
did this statement emphasize the essentially confirmatory role played by “the people” in
Patriot strategy; it explicitly asserted the MPs’ intellectual priority in deciding to pursue a
short-money bill.
Of the responses, only that of John Hely-Hutchinson, Cork MP, expressed the
type of strong enthusiasm for instructions exhibited by Grattan in Parliament. In his
overstated support for the idea, Hely-Hutchinson seemed to be addressing his fellow
MPs’ reservations more than his constituents. When the latter chose to speak on any
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matter whatsoever, he opined, “their sentiments ought to be received with reverence …
they truly are the Voice of the People.” In an explicit jab at the likes of his fellow Cork
MP Richard Longfield and John Foster of Louth, he insisted that there could be no
distinction between ends and means. To agree with the nation’s collective voice on the
importance of a free trade was also to agree with the means they had deemed most likely
to achieve that end. Astonishingly, Hely-Hutchinson went on to flip the traditional
relationship of constituent and MP on its head, claiming that he was willing to trust their
(wise, patriotic) judgment, abdicating all responsibility to make judgment himself on
issues where “the people” saw fit to speak.44
The delicately worded responses of nearly all MPs, even Patriots, combined with
the harsher rhetoric used in Parliamentary debate, reveals how deeply the ruling elite felt
threatened by this popular intrusion. The premise of representation, as they saw it, did not
imply that the one representing was in fact representative of his community, but that he
was, almost by definition, superior—qualified to lead them, and to exercise the
independent judgment that came with independent wealth. Presumably, that left gaps for
issues of local economic importance that an MP might need reminding of (especially
when few MPs in England or Ireland resided within their districts). If, however, the
people felt competent to judge truly national issues, the foundation of rule by the “better
sort” was shattered. It is ironic that in seeking a devolvement of powers to the Parliament
of Ireland, many Patriot leaders were unwilling to devolve power to their voters.
However, in order to achieve the changes they sought, the Patriots depended on popular
political demonstrations. They, in turn, nodded to that reliance by employing rhetoric of
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popular sovereignty. Generally, this arrangement worked; but the instructions exposed
the limits beyond which some in the alliance were not willing to go.
An anonymous 1780 pamphlet expressed this superiority-based view more
directly than any MPs dared, criticizing the authors of the instructions for falling into the
“error … of dictating to [their] superiors, in a business which they do not understand.”45
The author wished that “the conduct of our affairs m[ight] be left free to the deliberations
of our representatives … [for] they have virtue and spirit enough to do what is right in
opposition to the resolves of arrogance and presumption.”46 More strident in its rhetoric
than most, the author feared the philosophical implications of the instructions because
they raised questions about who was fit to govern, and what set the governing elite apart
from those they ruled (or at least, those who voted for them). It might be said that the
instructions were made possible by rhetoric of popular sovereignty, and in turn they made
that phrase something more than merely rhetorical.
Aftermath: The Parliamentary Reform Movement
The Patriot movement made two big policy pushes in the years following the
loosening of the Navigation Acts. In each phase, associational politics remained an
important feature, and some of the fundamental arguments about representation raised by
the instructions carried over to these new contexts. The immediate goal after “free trade”
was “legislative independence.” This entailed setting Ireland on a constitutionally equal
footing to England—rendering it an autonomous kingdom linked to its neighbor only
through a common monarchy. In practice, this meant the repeal of the Declaratory Act
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and Poynings’ Law: the former asserted Westminster’s theoretical sovereignty over
Dublin, while the latter set up mechanisms to enforce it. As with the trade concessions,
extra-parliamentary action proved decisive. In March of 1782, the Volunteers held a
massive convention at Dungannon in Ulster County, which resolved “that the claim of
any body of men, other than the King, Lords, and Commons of Ireland, to make laws to
bind this kingdom, is unconstitutional, illegal and a grievance.”47 The following month,
Parliament passed a “Declaration of Rights” (modelled after the famous English
constitutional settlement of 1689) echoing the Volunteers’ demands, to which
Westminster soon acceded.
The Patriot leadership was happy to be led by the popular wing in this instance
because they saw how effective armed companies of ordinary men had been in provoking
British fears and in giving the imprimatur of “the people” to their own actions.
Furthermore, as most of the resolutions debated and passed at Dungannon were drawn up
by Parliamentary leaders Henry Grattan and Henry Flood, there was an important sense
in which the elites remained in control.48 Nevertheless, in an irony not lost on Grattan, the
primacy of the Irish Parliament had been secured from outside it. In two speeches given
in 1782, Grattan tried to reconcile this apparent contradiction to those who had found the
calling of the convention “alarming.” First, he questions how meaningful it would have
been had Parliament voted for an increase to its own powers, “unsupported by the
people.” Some demonstration of popular support was necessary with the alteration of the
constitution on the line. Drawing on the radical idea of an “anti-parliament” in circulation
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at the time, Grattan termed the Dungannon meeting “an original transaction” on par with
the grant of Magna Carta or even, more audaciously (and more confusingly), the
founding of Christianity. “Necessity compelled” the sovereign people to assemble,
through representatives, on behalf of their liberties. “[E]very man has a share in the
government, and in order to act or speak they must confer” (185). Importantly, however,
they “confer[red]” sovereignty onto temporary representatives whose object was to
restore power to regular, constitutional representatives.49
Grattan showed considerable precision in delineating under precisely which
conditions an extra-constitutional assembly might be afforded legitimacy. The Third
Dungannon Convention, held 8 September 1783, which was followed by a Convention in
Dublin that November, would violate nearly all of them. Volunteer leaders had, in
correspondence with English radicals, decided that their next target would be
parliamentary reform—the abolition of “rotten boroughs” in favor of a more
representative scheme of election. By itself, this goal was likely to encounter stiff
resistance from a host of MPs, a large majority of whom hailed from these types of
districts. To make matters worse, by the time they met, the Treaty of Paris was freshly
signed (just the week prior!), and many in Dublin and Westminster began to question
why these paramilitary companies had not already been disbanded.
Opponents of the Conventions coalesced around two principal arguments, both of
which drew heavily on the turbulent history of the late Roman republic. First, as a
military organization, the Volunteers had no right to demand anything of the civil
government. The coup-like optics of men in uniform attempting to dictate systemic
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change to an elected body, which had plagued the first convention, only became more
concerning in a climate of international peace. This was, however, a problematic
argument for Patriot MPs to make, as many had freely accepted the help of the first and
second conventions. Then the Dublin assembly happened. The prospect of armed men
descending on the capital to intimidate the constitutional representatives of the people
recalled the days of Sulla and Caesar—or at least it did to MPs eager to resist reform.50
Aside from raising the specter of the government’s violent overthrow,
representatives developed a constitutional rationale for opposing the Volunteers. In doing
so, they returned to Grattan’s argument from the previous year that achieving legislative
independence from Britain was the full extent of the required constitutional change.
Parliament was now free to act for itself, they explained; thus, there was no need for any
more “original transactions”—all matters, even as something as foundational as electoral
reform, now had to be pursued through standard procedures. As the Provost of the House
pointed out, it was to support “the constitution, and the privileges of Parliament
associated with it,” that “the nation” had risen up to begin with.51 Ironically, then, and
dangerously, a movement that had originally set itself up in support of Parliament now
positioned itself against it. There was a historical element to this debate as well. The
original structure of Ireland’s free “Anglo-Saxon” constitution had been restored; any
additional change could cross over into the territory of radicalism. John Toler, member
for Tralee, reminded his colleagues that “innovation in the modes of receiving suffrages”
always led to revolution, pointing to the example of the Roman Gracchi brothers. For all
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the vehemence of their opposition, Grattan insisted he wanted to “preserve perfect union
between Parliament and the Volunteers.”52
That many in Parliament were only able to view the Volunteers through the
(recent) historical lense of the crises of the Revolutionary War shows how little they
understood the impact of English (and American) radical opinion on the popular Patriots.
Through their activism, the Anglo- and Scotch-Irish middling sorts—freeholders,
shopkeepers, merchants—had taken on the role of “the People,” and through this
abstraction had come to wield a level of power they would not easily surrender. In fact,
parliamentary reform was in many ways the natural next step in creating an Irish nation
where the people, whether through instructions, petitions or the vote, could exercise their
sovereignty more regularly. Yet, however logical within their political theory, the
people’s turn against Parliament marked a huge rupture in how the Patriot movement
conceived of itself. The fictive “union” of sentiment so carefully propped up by both
sides during the instructions episode was coming undone—but that did not stop some
people from attempting to salvage it.
In Peter Tarsinnen’s succinct phrasing, one dominant question in radical politics
on both sides of the Irish Sea (and indeed, of the Atlantic) during the last decades of the
eighteenth century was “whether the legislature or the people were the final arbiters of
constitutional matters.”53 Peter Burrowes, a barrister based in Dublin, tried to thread the
needle in his full-throated defense of the Dublin Convention, the somewhat-misleadingly
titled 1784 pamphlet Plain Arguments in Defence of the People’s Absolute Dominion
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over the Constitution. Burrowes combined unambiguous support for a theoretical
doctrine of popular sovereignty while shying away from the idea of an anti-parliament. In
the pamphlet, he expresses surprise that many thinkers, including the “luminous and
sagacious” John Locke, had found themselves in a dilemma on this point: “The people
cannot reform the constitution [they believe], for any act of theirs would be a dissolution
of government; nor can the legislature reform itself, for no power is competent to alter the
constitution, but the society at large.” For Burrowes, the solution was simple. The
Convention did not have the authority to alter the constitution on its own, but by
assembling it gave “the best possible collection of the sense of the community” to
Parliament, which could then credibly claim to act on behalf of “the society at large” to
remake the rules by which the state governed.54
Unfortunately for Burrowes, however “plain” he felt his arguments to be, many
Patriot MPs disputed the conclusions he drew from the premise of popular sovereignty.
While by this point almost universally acknowledged in rhetoric, the doctrine lent itself to
a wide variety of purposes and positions. In response to Dungannon, Representative Daly
simply fumed that “the People” thought they could “bully the House” into agreeing with
them.55 Most MPs, however, were far cleverer in their objections. Toler, for one,
disagreed that the Volunteers had any claim to embody the national will, calling them
“the offspring of neither Parliament nor the People.”56
Representative Ogle forged an even more audacious position, one that popular
writers had great difficulty refuting. He positioned himself as the true heir of the spirit of
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the free trade crisis, arguing that his own constituents were “the only authority on Earth
that ha[d] any right to instruct” him.57 If a supposedly national assembly’s orders
conflicted with the instructions of his particular constituents, what then? During the great
flashpoints of the Revolutionary War-era in Ireland, instructions had been used to secure
a free trade, whereas a Volunteer convention had been used to secure parliamentary
independence. Thus, by 1783, those were the two great tools in the box of the movement.
A military convention was an affront in peacetime, so Ogles challenged supporters to use
instructions if they wanted to get their way. This was, however, an absurd request, as the
whole parliamentary reform was premised on the current districts being structured in such
a way that they would not reflect the national will. Nevertheless, hat made it so effective
was the precedent of the 1779 episode. The Patriots who had spoken in favor of the rights
of constituents then were among the most radical in the caucus. Now, of necessity, the
Volunteers were advancing an expanded, and, to some, radically different theory of
representation, which not all of their former allies were willing to embrace.
Beyond their historical and constitutional reasons for opposing the instrument of
the convention, one might ask why so many parliamentary Patriots opposed reform. No
doubt those from “rotten boroughs” were eager to maintain their seats, and probably felt
they had done well representing the nation within that system. The earlier debates over
instructions shed some light on this debate. Many who rejected the short-money bill
instructions made clear that the quality they felt should be valued in representatives was
not alignment with the people’s will, or representativeness, but rather independence of
judgment. In saying no to their constituents, they often simultaneously insisted that they
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were not under the influence of “Castle patronage,” as many instructions had alleged in
thinly veiled terms. Many advocates of parliamentary reform made their case on the
independence spectrum as well. One W. W. Seward, in The Rights of the People
Asserted, insisted that in order for representatives to be “free and uninfluenced, they
should be likewise freely-elected.”58 Reaching back to the treatises of Locke and the
satires of Juvenal, Seward made the case for the Whiggish view that the sale of offices
marked the end of liberty. However, representatives like General Cunningham could
plausibly point out that representativeness often conflicted with independence. In a
separate debate on an absentee land tax, held the same week as the session on the
Dungannon and Dublin Conventions, Cunningham insisted to his interlocutor Newenham
that his position was wholly unbiased: “I speak as an independent member, neither biased
by a minister nor under the influence of a county.”59 Cunningham equated pressure by
the Lord Lieutenant, a universally acknowledged source of corruption, with “county”
instructions, firmly rebuking civil society’s attempts to participate more actively in the
governing process.
Conclusion
Although nothing was ever done about it, agitation for Parliamentary reform,
including additional Volunteer conventions, continued throughout the first years of
“Grattan’s Parliament” (1782-1800). The discussions around it cannot be understood
without the context of legislative instructions, including the commitment many MPs had
developed to them. This is illustrated by a debate that broke out in the House in 1785
over trial by jury. Earlier that year, the Attorney General had prosecuted the County
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Sheriff of Dublin, Henry Steevens Rieley, for convening an assembly of freeholders to
elect delegates for an upcoming reform convention on High Street in Dublin. The
government alleged that Rieley had abused his “posse comitatis [sic]” authority—or the
right to convene “the strength of the community” to combat an imminent security crisis—
in support of “faction.” Rieley appealed to Parliament.
The debate on his case turned on obscure jurisdictional questions many in the
House admitted they were not trained to answer. However, the political motivation
behind the decision to take up Rieley’s cause was clear: many Patriots felt the Attorney
General’s “arbitrary mandates against one sheriff” were meant to quash all political
assembly. After all, the instructions of the free trade crisis had been issued in meetings
held under similar auspices, with the county sheriff presiding. Charles Westby, always a
prominent supporter of legislative instructions, made the comparison explicit, asserting
the inviolable right of “associating together, and appointing meetings in their different
towns and counties, for the purpose of considering and giving such constitutional
instructions to their representatives as they think may be for the advantage of this
kingdom.”60 It is difficult to tell for certain, but it seems likely Westby meant to contrast
the constitutional legislative instructions he endorsed, based on assemblies within the
“different towns and counties” with the kind of nationwide Volunteer conventions that
had caused so much disruption in the past few years (and for which declaring explicit
support would elicit little sympathy from his audience). His point, in that case, was that,
however worthy the cause, the shady legal tactics employed by the Attorney General—
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which controversially included trying Rieley without a jury in the Court of the King’s
Bench—could end up being used to quash even legitimate political activity by the public.
More research is needed to understand the full complexities of 1780s Patriot
politics. It is clear even from this review, however, that the gap between its Parliamentary
leaders and their newly politicized base only widened, even as figures on both sides
eagerly tried to mask their differences. It is also clear that, even as the frame of reference
shifted, the arguments about the proper nature of representative government first
articulated during the free trade crisis continued to have resonance. In fact, the refusal of
MPs like Ogles to accept the instructions of anyone but their direct constituents shows the
stickiness of the categories established during the height of the Revolution. Yet this did
not stop various groups from trying to refashion them to their own ends, to better address
escalating disputes about the nature of the Irish polity. Understanding the pivotal debates
of 1779, when cracks first began to appear in the Patriot coalition, is the best way to
understand the polarized politics of the years that followed.
In the general jubilee following the grant of legislative independence, Grattan,
acknowledging none of these cracks, exulted in the cohesion of the Patriot movement.
“The upper orders, the property and abilities of the country, formed with the volunteer;
and the volunteer had sense enough to obey him” (in Dickinson, ed., 222). Partly, he was
attempting to frame the constitutional revolution that had just occurred in a nonthreatening way: contra its critics Parliamentary, not popular, sovereignty has been the
goal. The movement was not radical, not American. Yet the illusion of control Grattan
expressed was central to the alliances that held the Patriot movement together. Therefore,
the fact that the elite struggled to maintain it when it was disputed from below is
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historiographically significant. There were conflicts, of which the instructions are an
important early example. The axis of discussion shifted later on, but the results of the
earlier episode reverberated, determining the way arguments were framed and the way
that politicians positioned themselves ideologically, and to their colleagues and
constituents. Too much of the relevant historiography, whether its focus is on high or low
politics, portrays the story of this era as one of Ireland versus the British Empire, or
Dublin versus Westminster.61 Recognizing the internecine disputes of the Patriots
enriches not only our understanding of that movement’s complexity but serves to
illustrate the dialogical development of modern ideas about representation more
generally.
The fact that these debates on representation occurred in highly stratified Ireland
should also prompt us to reconsider several historiographical assumptions about national
boundaries and the origins of modern politics. In his landmark work The Creation of the
American Republic, 1776-1787, Gordon Wood anchors the American post-revolutionary
boom in legislative instructions (and the controversy that accompanied them) firmly
within colonial history and the developments of the Revolutionary War. Wood argues
that the debates about the use of legislative instructions in the United States contributed
to the development of a “uniquely American science of politics,” in which representatives
were expected to “bring home the bacon” to their districts.62 Clearly this conclusion must
be revised. America was not the only Anglophone country experiencing debates over
instructions. While the rise in social and economic power of the middling sort probably
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contributed to “democratization” on both sides of the Atlantic, it is unlikely to account
for everything either. Instead, it appears that the widespread introduction of the rhetoric
of popular sovereignty, once unleashed, drove expectations for a style of governance that
was more truly representative.
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